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Binding Experiences for a First-Person Approach

*Looking at Indian ways of thinking
(darśana) and acting (nāṭya)
in the context of current discussions
on 'consciousness'*

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By and large, if we follow the current discussions on consciousness in the West we get two impressions. First, one gets to think that the understanding of consciousness is dependent on the understanding of, if not the brain, at least the physical processes guided by some mechanism and having the capabilities for replicating the phenomenon in *vitro* with the help of controlled experiments. Second, there is no consensual definition of the problem, method and the major goals of enquiry itself; and third there is insufficient recognition of the very complexity and subjective nature of the phenomenon. All the three features have jointly contributed towards generating vast literature, dialogues and discussions about a variety of issues relating to consciousness, the primary one being empirical research and on medical possibilities, especially in the area of ‘abnormalities’.

1. Introduction

Binding experiences has been the singlemost issue in the center of focus in the last decade of discussions on ‘consciousness’

crossing disciplines: neurobiological, quantum mechanical, computational, theoretical, psychological etc. Though the details of what constitutes 'experience' differ by method and perspective, a consensus has emerged that (i) to explain 'consciousness' is to explain 'experience'; (ii) to explain experience is to explain its unity and binding nature. Following this preliminary consensus, however implicit it is, many discussions took place/are taking place from the first, second and third-person perspectives, though main stream discussion is still dominated to a greater extent by third-person approaches.

Given the complexity of 'experience' as a phenomenon for investigation, or as involved in our understanding, it is helpful to look at alternative views about what constitutes an 'experience'. I hope to do this with the help of instances from Indian epistemology and Indian dramaturgy. I will be looking at two different traditions of thinking and experiencing: Indian epistemology in the classical systems of Indian thought and Indian dramaturgy as dealt with in the classical text *Nāṭya Śāstra*. By doing this I hope to emphasize the importance of 'experience' as lying in its nuances and juxtapose it with as it is conceptualized now in the 'consciousness' discussions (which is reduced to third-person physical data, deprived of first-person intimacy, and also the depth and breadth of meaning). The attempt is to present the thesis that if consciousness cannot be understood without looking at 'experience', experience certainly cannot be reduced for

convenient reductive (physical, psychoanalytic and cultural) methods of understanding but will have to be open for a variety of meanings validated from first-person perspectives. This will definitely take away the reductive scientific monopoly of explaining consciousness in a singular way, but will encourage scientific methods to reexamine the normative criteria for 'truth' and 'reality'.

2. The One Puzzle

I think there is an interesting and serious change taking place in the current discussions on consciousness. This turn is based on and compelled by the intractable relationship of 'consciousness' with 'experience'. The nearest empirical idea for the unity and subjective nature of consciousness is 'experience'. Hence the scientific focus on 'experience'. The interesting part of discussions is that though there is a recognition of experience as vital in the study of consciousness, the attempt itself is to strip 'experience' of the qualities which would make it of experiential nature (unitary and subjective) and study it on the basis of empirical standards such as causal connections, neural influences, neural locations etc. I am not suggesting that brain research is not needed or even that it is of small importance. Certainly, it is very significant in its own right. But if our guidelines and methods are not based on our basic premise to study consciousness (experience, which is unitary and subjective) then we certainly cannot make a claim

that brain studies, apart from giving new knowledge about brain functions, would also lead to a complete theory of consciousness. The puzzle in the current discussions on consciousness is that of the persistent conflict between epistemology and phenomenology.

If we look at the major semantic trends in the current discussions, views that are discussed and debated do not any more fall into the classical division of reductionistic and non-reductionistic, or empirical and non-empirical approaches. However third-person the approach is, when it comes to the descriptive definition of consciousness, the ideas are based on qualitative features of consciousness. The discussions on empathy¹, meaning², meme³, and mirror neurons⁴ are some instances. On the other side, the growing amount of discussions on meditation⁵ and altered states of consciousness⁶ give third-person references, however subjective the discussed experience is. A possible reason for this trend to interrelate and bridge first-person experience and third-person definition is the recognition of a distinct characteristic of 'consciousness', namely, that it is not completely defined by empirical standards or completely understood by first-person experience⁷.

3. Self and Meaning

The extent of the meanings imputed to 'consciousness' most often crosses empirical limits and sometimes even diffuses with

qualitative experiential descriptions. The one major problem in consciousness studies is the semantics of 'consciousness'. Unfortunately this prominent meta-analysis of the discussions is dismissed in recent discussions⁸. It is very important that there be not only a well-laid out definition for the problem but also a methodological consistency. This does not mean that even before the enquiry a complete theory of consciousness is postulated. To have the semantics of consciousness given importance at the start itself means that the theory will not be drawn based on the limitations of the methods, but on the original contention about 'consciousness'.

What exactly are we trying to understand by the study of consciousness? The answers could range from neural functions to subjective experience. It is again interesting to see that the meanings we give to 'consciousness' are wider conceptually than the strict semantic (in current discussions) definition of consciousness. This is even clear at the starting point of discussion when the immediate reference is to 'experience'.

It is in this context, that I wish to juxtapose the idea of 'self' as an alternative to the discussions on 'consciousness'. The word 'self' is more comprehensive than the word 'consciousness' since it includes connotations at different levels of experience and also of the subjective identity which is important to understand the unity of experience.

The discussion about consciousness is discussion about experience. The discussion about experience is discussion about the 'self'. 'Experience' and 'self' certainly relate to something which is more than what is happening in the brain, more than abnormal conditions, more than ordinary conditions, more than transcendental states.⁹

4. Indian Thinking

There are two key ideas in classical Indian philosophical thinking which strike the attention of any student. These are '*ātma*' and '*darśana*'. These words perform a major double function, which is also the distinctive feature of the whole of Indian thinking, of combining epistemology and phenomenology. For this reason, '*ātma*' could mean either the 'self' that is engaged in a particular act, or the self which is untouched by any act; '*darśana*' could mean either realistic perception or intuitive thinking. The basic reason for such a foundational trend in the whole of Indian philosophical thinking goes beyond the felicity of a strict structural language (Sanskrit). It is an attempt not to break, and define, the 'self' into identities based on the context; experience into ordinary and extraordinary; at the same time give thinking and understanding a depth which is inclusive and open-ended but not divisive and hierarchical.

What constitutes darśana and what does not

Before I get to the details of the epistemology of *darśana*, I will briefly look at what constitutes *darśana*, and what does not. The word '*darśana*' connotes the philosophical enterprise to think and to delve with ideas so as to:

- (i) ascertain what is true knowledge,
- (ii) to understand new ideas, and,
- (iii) to understand the nature of the enquirer himself.

Jñāna is a complex concept in classical Indian thinking. It not only refers to logical and epistemological methods and answers but also to states of mind which are important in the discussion about the primal nature of self. Hence, the discussions on *jñāna* and *pramāṇa* are always interrelated to understanding ethical, axiological, aesthetic and spiritual issues. There is a constant attempt to reconcile and integrate different experiences, and the existence of contradictions so as to generate worldviews based on an understanding of life with answers for fundamental questions about self-identity, nature of world, creation, purpose of life, value systems etc. There is widespread criticism that *darśana* does not have teleological value and does not extend its scope for change and modification. This perception might have been influenced by the complex method used by the schools using a variety of epistemological tools such as metaphors, imageries and stories, as equally valid, along with logical analysis, anticipating counterpositions and affiliation to definite theories of what constitutes right knowledge. Not

strictly adhering to a definite pattern of enquiry could lead to the thinking that what is offered is a closed philosophical position to save the proponent and the follower of that particular tradition. What the *darśanakārā*-s are interested in is to give a new place for emerging ideas in the worldview and allow a new understanding, crossing structural rigidity in thinking. Clearly, what is not the feature of *darśana* is an empirical haste to explain away things.

4.1 Epistemology of *Darśana*

Epistemological openness

Indian epistemology is constituted by complexes more than singular concepts. I will list a few such complexes, without going into the technical details, to demonstrate that Indian epistemology is an open-ended and integral enterprise.

Guidelines for discourse

Concepts and categories are vital to any kind of discourse. The school that perfected the art of discourse in Indian thinking was *Nyāya*. *Tarkasaṃgraha* which is the foundational text of logic and discourse, is also the text followed, for that reason, by later schools in developing their own theories. What makes *Tarkasaṃgraha* so very interesting and foundational is the way in which it defines and elucidates the necessary components for a discourse from both the epistemological and subjective points of view. Both definition (*lakṣana*) of an entity or idea, and the guidelines for discourse (*anubandha catuṣṭaya*) are

discussed with equal importance in the text. The meaning of the world *tarka* is also specific, in that it does not imply a pure logical analysis but a complex activity of discourse guided by strict definitions and goals so as to have “....a compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other ontological categories...”¹⁰

There are sixteen *padārthā*-s which one studies in order to master *Nyāya* dialectics. A *padārtha* is defined as a “...knowable thing (*jñeya*) or as a validly cognizable thing (*pramēya*) or as a nameable or denotable thing which corresponds to a word (*abhidheya*).¹¹ These categories are means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), instances (*dṛṣtānta*), established conclusions (*siddhānta*), members of syllogism (*avayava*), analysis (*tarka*), decisive knowledge (*nirṇaya*), arguing for truth (*vāda*), arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory (*jalpa*), destructive argument (*vitāṇḍa*), fallacious reasons (*hētvābhāsa*), quibbling (*cala*), specious and unavailing objections (*jāti*), and vulnerable standpoints (*nighrahassthāna*).¹² The discussion on *padārtha* is an elaborate one in classical thinking.

The concept of ‘definition’ (*lakṣaṇa*) is another complex, which according to *Nyāya* tells what an entity ‘is’ by saying what it ‘is not’. Definition is “.....not merely an explication of the connotation of a term; but it is a proposition specifying the

differentia or the differentiating feature of the species or the thing defined".¹³ *Lakṣaṇa* is defined as a specific feature (*asādhāraṇa dharma*) which is free from the three faults of a definition such as over-applicability (*ativyāpti*), partial inapplicability (*avyāpti*) and total inapplicability (*asambhava*). A definition is faulty by *ativyāpti* when it refers to certain qualities which are characteristic of the entity defined as well as of something not intended to be defined. A definition is faulty by *avyāpti* when the definition does not refer to some of the characteristic features of the entity defined. A definition is faulty by *asambhava* when the definition refers to qualities which are totally non-characteristic of the entity defined.

Guidelines for teleology

Another important complex which is considered in almost all schools of Indian thinking is the notion of *anubandha catuṣṭaya* (four-fold preliminaries) though this is well-specified as a part of dialectics in *Tarkasaṃgraha*. The four-fold preliminaries for any discourse are *viśaya* (theme of discourse), *prayojana* (major goal), *sambandha* (relation between the theme of discussion and the treatise), and *adhikāri* (for whom a discourse is designed).¹⁴ The trend of specifying the objective and subjective guidelines of a discourse is also found in the foundational texts of *Vēdānta* and *Mimāṃsa*. The starting verse of the text specifies the nature of enquiry such as for *brahman*, *dharma* etc.¹⁵ The defining characteristic of a discourse clarifies any doubt which may ensue later in the discourse about what the

discourse is guided by. The thematic specification of the discourse also helps the student to have a clear picture about what the discourse will not talk about or to what theme it will be restricted to. Even if the theme of the discourse is given prior to entering the discourse the discussion could at some point raise the question of teleology in the mind of student. Hence the theme as well as the purpose of a discussion on such a theme is specified initially. Though it could be a meta-question outside the scope of the discourse it is essential also to anticipate at least to some extent the relation between the discourse and the theme of the discourse itself which would enable the understanding of how far the treatise or discourse is representative of the theme. The final and the most important preliminary factor for any discourse is to specify who is qualified to enter into such a discourse. This is a major rule for meta-discourse, which I think, is almost forgotten in the current discussions on a complex theme like 'consciousness'. The recognition of the aptitude of the person as playing a vital role in the success of discourse and understanding implies the subjective factor involved in epistemological enterprises. It also implies that understanding is always finally related to the basic aptitude of the student, which once again anticipates the essential relation between epistemology and phenomenology, knowledge of something and experience. One instance of expounding the nature of *adhikāri* could be seen in the primal text of *Advaita 'Tattvabodha'* where Śankarācārya talks about '*sādhana catuṣṭaya*'.¹⁶

Guidelines for validation

The issue of validation (*prāmāṇya*) is a very important complex extensively dealt with by the schools of Indian thinking. The discussion on validating knowledge ranges from theories of knowledge to theories of reality. The word '*pramāṇa*' etymologically means 'means of measurement' or 'that which produces knowledge'.¹⁷ The concept of *pramāṇa* though initially interpreted as a theory of knowledge, of ascertaining knowledge, its function is not completely understood without taking into consideration two of the characteristic features of *pramana* as perceived by most of the classical schools of Indian thinking. These two characteristics '*abhādhitatva*', of non-contradiction, and '*anadhigatatva*', of novelty, lays down the condition for validating knowledge.¹⁸ It is not possible to validate a statement to be true or false if there is another knowledge statement which contradicts the claim of the previous statement. Being non-contradicted by another statement alone does not perform the role for validation. The characteristic of non-contradiction is also to be followed by the feature of novelty. Discovery of new knowledge is as important as ascertaining of it. Validation also has to look into the possibility of newness whether it is epistemological or ontological. The feature of 'novelty' implies once again the epistemological openness evident in Indian thought.

A major distinction in the Indian theories of knowledge is regarding the position on the origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment

of validity (*jñapti*). The validity of a cognition is decided, in some schools, by the presence of certain characteristics intrinsic to knowledge, and in some other schools, by the presence of certain characteristics extrinsic to knowledge. Following the same lines of thinking, the two positions about invalidity of knowledge are that it is decided by extrinsic characteristics or intrinsic characteristics. Validity itself is ascertained in some schools by its very intrinsic nature (*svatapramāṇah*), and in others by its extrinsic nature (*paratapramāṇah*).

Two paradigms

There are two paradigms in the classical schools, inspite of the differences in their metaphysical and epistemological positions. These are (i) what we see and experience, which is constituted by the given and the immanent, (ii) what we can see and experience which is constituted by the possibilities and the transcendent. It is within these two paradigms that the elaborate and detailed discussion on fundamental experiences such as pain and pleasure, sorrow and happiness, selfishness and selflessness, freedom and bondage, the given and the possible etc. takes place. *Darśana* is an attempt to bridge the seemingly two contradictory paradigms through an exploration of the self based on systematic discussions on (i) theoretical, (ii) experiential, and (iii) transcendental issues.

What falls under theoretical issues

Theoretical problems are envisaged by the building of tools for thinking such as abstraction, generalization and conceptualization guided by the question of meaning, certainty and new knowledge. The factorization of 'new knowledge' in epistemology gives importance to intuitive thinking all through the discussion. A general division can be made of the theories the *darśanakāra*-s debate on, such as:

- (i) theory of what is given: which relates to ontological questions about the nature of the world, the nature of the self, the nature of life and death,
- (ii) theory of the what and how of knowledge which relates to epistemological questions about meaning and validity,
- (iii) theory of what is beyond the given (if any) which relates to metaphysical and teleological questions about the nature of God, the nature of ultimate causes, the nature of self and the nature of reality,
- (iv) theory of spiritual, mental and physical disciplines which relates to questions about ethical issues, value systems, duty, responsibility, selfishness, transcendences and new perceptions about self-identity.

4.2 Experience of *Darśana*

Metaphysical openness

If we examine the classical schools of Indian thought, we find that though each school allows elaborate discussion on the epistemology of its philosophy, the foundational thought is metaphysical. But the metaphysical foundation is not to be mistaken for dogmatic and closed ideas. The metaphysical openness of ideas is evident from the fact that they are based on certain teleological assumptions. Discussions on the nature of (self) is juxtaposed with physical (as in *Cārvaka* system), ethical or spiritual guidelines as in almost all schools. To understand the given nature of self and its transcendent possibilities the understanding of self is important. The key feature of such an understanding is that it is not an epistemological exegesis but a first-person phenomenological examination. The concept of *jñāna* is a complex concept and is not to be merely translated as 'knowledge' as we understand it in popular fashion. The discussion on the familiar/given and the transcendent self (*jīva* and *ātma*) is guided by the continuous and rigorous distinguishing of the one from each other at every instance of experiencing. The conflict between the near and familiar/given nature or self, and the distant and transcendent nature of self forms the focus of attention for the *darśana*. The attempt of *darśana* is to solve the conflict in such a manner that the duals involved in it are integrated rather than segregated. The idea of liberation hence is not a singular event in time but a constant understanding and experiencing

of the complexity of the contradiction of the given and the transcendental. The distinguishing of the *ātma* and *anātma* (the real nature and the given nature of self), *ātma anātma vyāpārah*, is the singlemost exposition for which the rest of the epistemological, ethical and phenomenological theories are expounded. It is the metaphysical openness which is the hallmark of Indian thinking.

Spiritual and ontological openness

In recent discussions the word 'spiritual' has gained new meanings, many of which emphasize the role of personal growth, ecological awareness, empathy, intersubjective transactions, emotional well-being, efficiency in expressions, creative living. The distinct feature of the philosophical traditions of Indian thinking is its spiritual openness, by which I mean, not just a liberal philosophy, but the facility to integrate new experience and new understanding into an evolving scheme of ideas, all leading and pointing to self-exploration. The ideal of spiritual living is given foremost importance rather than moral and epistemological theories. It is not to say that the ethical guidelines and practices are less important in these traditions but to suggest that all such theories and discussions are addressed from a spiritual platform which discuss the nature of self and the world of experience and the relationship between them. Liberation is the key concept however radically different the guidelines suggested for it by different schools are. Identity and self are the key problems addressed to with

the help of metaphysical positions, epistemological theories and ethical guidelines. The breadth and length of discussions in *darśana* is interestingly just not different discussions on what exactly the nature of self is, but mutually reinforcing dialogues on the consensus view that all discussions are to be guided by the coordinating concept of 'self'. Invariably the discussions in *darśana* are those leading from the recognition of 'self' and 'identity' as larger categories for thinking. It could be for this reason that epistemology (*tarka*) does not have the supremacy in deciding the course of events and validation, but only with equal participation of reflective thinking (*vicāra*) in discourse. Analytical thinking can deliver its goods only if it is accompanied by reflective (*vicāra*) and intuitive (*nidhidhyāsana*) thinking.

What falls under experiential and transcendental issues

An interesting characteristic in the classical systems of Indian thinking is the overriding issue above all issues to connect and catapult from what would be considered the given to what is possible. The concept about experience is not strictly about what is caused by an extraneous factor/s but what is possible by the distinctive and unique nature of the individual. Therefore, experience is not merely a theme for understanding based on its immediate context such as cause, or results, but a tool for further exploration of the self. The ordinariness and extra-ordinariness of an experience is understood from the standpoint of the self rather than from the standpoint of its causes. This trend also impels the understanding of the self

along with the understanding of the object of experience. The object of experience, the result of experience and the experiencer constitute the triad of the complex phenomenon of experience, each of which is significant in the understanding of the other.

The major experiential issues which are discussed in the classical schools are also interconnected with the major transcendental issues. Thus the experience and understanding of pain and pleasure are connected with guidelines for transcending pleasure and pain; experience and understanding of freedom and bondage are connected with the guidelines for transcending self-identities and rigid perceptions about the context; and, experience and understanding of different states of mind are connected with the guidelines for transcending words, verbal structures and attributed meanings.

Junctions and meeting points

Junctions and meeting points between the discussions on theoretical, experiential and transcendental issues are quite unique to *darśana*. For instance, ethical and spiritual discipline is necessary for new experiences and knowing self differently; knowledge of self could change the way the nature of the given is understood; knowledge of self could reorient experience; knowledge of self could allow for new responses to the situation/context. What distinguishes the Indian way of thinking from what we call today the Western way of thinking, is the

curious connection present in *darśana* between theoretical, experiential and transcendental issues. It is also this distinguishing feature of Indian thinking which is often misrepresented as 'mystic' and 'other-worldly'. The important point missed here is that we fail to recognize the fact that what interested Indian thinking was not the linearity and immediate availability of rigid structures of knowledge but an open-endedness where experience and reflection could together bring about the re-orientation of how we construe our self-identities and how we respond to the given.

The foundational issues, crossing the rigidity of being theoretical, experiential or transcendental, which are embedded in the *darśana* are (i) about the human mind, consciousness and experience, and (ii) about self-identity. The guidelines for the exploration of these embedded issues are (i) abstraction: to identify the unitary in the discrete, (ii) placeability: to have an ontological meaning for any experience, its object and its experiencer, (iii) practise: to have values and discipline as essential guidelines for self-exploration.

5. Indian Dramaturgy

The foundational text of Indian dramaturgy is '*Nāṭya Śāstra*' authored by Bharatamuni. The available form of the text comprises 5600 verses coupled with prose, though the original version is said to have had more than 30,000 verses. It is a

complete treatise on Indian dance, drama and music. The text has an exhaustive thematic structure since it deals with a complex conception of drama (*nāṭya*) constituted by what could be described as objective and subjective features. There is elaborate discussion, on the one hand, on the characteristics of playhouses, different kinds of plays, different and complex gestures and movements, rules of prosody, metres and music, uses of language, styles of characters, costumes and ornaments. On the other hand, there are discussions on emotions and mental states which are their causes, mutuality of emotions and mental states, rapport between actor and spectator, mental and physical nature of actors and spectators, preliminary mystic rituals for effective representation and final goals of drama. At the same time there is a structural rigidity as to the epistemological structure, and openness about the subjective expression, relationship between the actor and the spectator, goals of drama etc.

The complexity of the text can be seen at three levels:

- (i) in addressing the representation of different kinds of characters (mostly mythical) with different states of minds through a joint participation of physical gesture and movements, mental states and emotions, ritualistic preliminaries, costumes, music and space configuration,
- (ii) in addressing the unique relationship between the actor and the spectator, of the actor invoking a specific state of emotion in the spectator's mind, and

- (iii) in making possible a spontaneous and self-evolving nature of enjoyment for the audience in spite of the structured and specified composition.

The rigorous and specified rules of *nāṭya* together with the integral approach to emotions, first-person experience of the actor and the spectator make *Nāṭya Śāstra* an insightful treatise as well as what can be conceived of as belonging to a higher order of cognition and experience, namely a wholesome representation of human emotions through a complex act of the external body (physical body gestures, costumes, music and plot) and the spiritual body (emotions, states of mind and unique relationship between the one who is presenting the re-representation and the one who is enjoying it).

5.1 Epistemology of *Nāṭya*

The word '*nāṭya*' does not have a one-word English equivalent. Before we get to the meaning of '*nāṭya*' it is important to keep in mind the distinction between '*nāṭya*', *nṛtta* and *nṛtya* (*nāṭya nṛtya nṛtta vivēkah*)¹⁹ which is the introductory theme discussed in *Nāṭya Śāstra*. *Nāṭya* is a combination of *nṛtya* (acting) and *nṛtta* (dance). *Nṛtya* is the visual and pantomimic representation of emotions and ideas. *Nṛtta* refers to movements of the body with gestures which are regulated by *tāla* (musical and interval). Though the text continues to give a complex definition of what constitutes

nāṭya the categorical statement made about it is that *nāṭya* has primarily to do with *rasa*.²⁰ Later *nāṭya* is explained using two key ideas which are *abhinaya* and *bhāva*. *Nāṭya* means visual representation (*abhinaya*) in its fourfold forms such as using parts of the physical body (*āṅgika*), verbal utterances (*vācika*), costumes and ornaments (*āhārya*) and physical signs of mental states (*sātvika*).²¹

Poise of expression

Abhinaya is defined as the expression, through the actor, of the meaning of the words of a literary (poetical) work with the help of *vibhāva* (emotions and states of mind physically represented) so as to invoke an uninterrupted flow of *rasa* (enjoyment) for the audience. The scope of *abhinaya* is extended beyond the rigidity of planned gestures and emotions by differentiating it to be of two distinct types: *lokadharmi* and *nāṭyadharmi*. *Lokadharmi* represents the objects and characters as they are portrayed in the mythical literature, and *natyadharmi* represents the objects and characters through suggestive movements from the setting of stage. An example of *nāṭyadharmi* is a suggestive movement of the eye or suggestive gesture by the hands to indicate something else through the imagination of the spectator.²²

The fulfillment of *nāṭya* is achieved through the effective and joint performance of different kinds of *abhinaya* and *mudra* (representation of objects, emotions and ideas through single

hand and combined hand gestures), the theme of the play, music and involvement of the spectators. The role of spectators is considered to be an active event that mutually influences the performance of the actor in terms of the representation of feelings.

It is not directly relevant to this paper to describe the technical details of the themes of various chapters of the text. But it is necessary to keep in mind during the ensuing discussion that the elaborate description in the text mainly follows two patterns:

- (i) discussion and detailed description of the different kinds of gestures of different parts of the body and their nuances, different kinds and features of plays and poetry, kinds of metres, characteristics of the actors, judges and spectators, use of languages, costumes and ornaments, and different kinds of musical instruments,
- (ii) discussion and description of *rasa* (emotions) and *bhāva* (mental states which produce emotions), the mental rapport between the actor and the spectator, the types of characters and mental and physical temperaments suitable for their portrayal, the goals of drama and how they are fulfilled; and preliminary rituals and settings to invoke a conducive environment before the start of *nāṭya*.

The concept of *nāṭya* evolves in the text through the development of both the above patterns which I would like to

describe as third-person and first-person approaches. The prescribed set of rules for *abhinaya* exists along with the spontaneity of the actor in representing the structured, and in evoking the *rasa* in the spectator. The visual and the character-oriented together with the subjective and self-oriented produces an aesthetic experience which could be further described as a spiritual experience. The act of representation, the preliminary settings and rituals etc. are connected with the cosmogony that the physical world is the *āṅgika abhinaya* of Śiva, the world of language is his *vācika abhinaya*, the universe consists of his *āhārya abhinaya* and ultimate happiness itself is his *sātvika abhinaya*.²³ The complexity of representing human emotions and at the same time invoking empathy in the spectator is brought out through *nāṭya* in a comprehensive manner using a rigorous epistemology and first-person experience for both the actor and the spectator.

5.2 Experience of Nāṭya

Nāṭya, though presented following a structured design about it through the portrayal of characters, in its primary nature is experiential and first-person-oriented. This is evidenced by the detailed discussion on *rasa*, *bhāva* and *prēkṣakatva*. The word *nāṭya* has its origin from the root 'naṭ' which means 'to act'. *Naṭa* is one who performs the act through different styles of *abhinaya*. *Nāṭya* is the art of 'naṭa'.²⁴ The importance given to *nāṭya* as a dramatic art has its origins in the 'act' itself of the actor. It is the *naṭa* who is responsible for *nāṭya* and not

vice versa. This is a significant feature since it emphasises the first-person-oriented approach to a complex event such as *nāṭya*.

Tasting the flavour

Rasa is a complex concept which is the central idea on which the experience of *nāṭya* is founded. The word *rasa* is variously translated as ‘relish’, ‘enjoyment’²⁵ and related to mean the object of relish or the feeling of relish itself. According to Bharatamuni *rasa* emerges out of the combining of three basic components such as *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāri*. They are also (*kāraṇa*, *kārya* and *sahakāri*) the determinant, consequent and auxiliary conditions of *rasa*. All three taken together comprise the *sthāyibhāva* which is directly responsible for the production of *rasa*. *Bhāva* is that which makes something happen.²⁶ In *Nāṭya Śāstra* *bhāva* is used as a technical word to relate to the mental states as responsible for producing *rasa* for the spectator through a combination of kinds of (*abhinaya*) gestures. Whether *rasa* is produced through *bhāva* or vice versa or whether they are mutually influenced is a debate which is prominent in the literature on *Nāṭya Śāstra* by various commentators. For the discussion in this paper, I will deal only with the detailed presentation of kinds of *rasa* and *bhāva*, one instance of *abhinaya* which is that of eyes (*dhrṣṭi*), and nature of effectiveness of *nāṭya* (*nāṭya siddhi nirupaṇa*), to show the importance given to the nuances and details of mental states, basic nature of experience and their

physical representations, with an attempt to give a third-person account of first-person experience.

Bharata enlists eight *rasa*-s as the primary *rasa*-s²⁷ and a total of forty-nine *bhāvā*-s which are classified as *sthāyibhāva* (eight in number), *vyabhicāribhāva* (thirty-three in number) and *sātvikabhāva* (eight in number). This classification refers to an evolution of mental states from its intense and pure states (*sthāyi*), to manifestation of the pure states in feelings and leading them to *rasa* (*vyabhicāri*), and to their physical signs (*sātvika*). Another classification is of the cause and effect of *bhāva* such as *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* respectively. The *sthāyibhāva* of *śōka* is produced by the *vibhāva* such as separation from the beloved, loss of dear ones and assets etc. *Śōka* is represented by the *anubhāva* such as tears, deep sighs etc. It is the *sthāyibhāva* which plays the key role in creating the rapport between the actor and spectator through the production of *rasa*.

Bharata enlists eight fundamental *sthāyibhāva*, thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāva*, eight *sātvikabhāva* and eight *rasā*²⁸ according to the *sthāyibhāva*²⁹ (See Appendix 1 and Note 30.)

Through the corner of the eye

Expression through the physical body, *āṅgika abhinaya*, is further classified into that falling under three types such as (i) *śariraja* (bodily), (ii) *mūkhaja* (facial), and (iii) *ceṣṭākṛta*

(through movements). There is another division of *anga* and *upāṅga*. *Aṅga* constitutes the *abhinaya* through head, hand, chest, sides, hips and feet. *Upāṅga* constitute *abhinaya* through eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips, cheeks and chin. The one instance of *abhinaya* through *upāṅga* that I will list here in detail is that of *dhṛṣṭi* (glances) since these are considered to be more visually representative of the *rasa*.

What I wish to imply through this listing is, the analysis and observation given to the detailed study of empirical features of the inner mental states and feelings belonging to another person as represented by the actor. The two levels of third-person reporting and first-person experience are interesting to note at this point. Through the *bhāvābhinaya* the actor represents the feelings of a person in a particular state of mind through the larger setting of stage, space, costumes and gesture (first instance of third-person reporting), and all the while undergoes the same state of mind so that the corresponding *rasa* is conveyed to the spectator (second level of third-person reporting). The enactment of the feelings is based on an understanding of the *bhāva* (pure states of mind) and identifying with them (second level of first-person experience) which was earlier experienced by another person (first level of first-person experience).

The glances which total thirty-six in number are of two kinds: (i) *rasadhṛṣṭi*, representative of the kind of *rasa* (relish), and (ii) *bhāvadhṛṣṭi*, representative of the kind of *bhāva* (pure state

of mind). Apart from the *dhṛṣṭi* there is a detailed description of the kinds of movements of the pupils, eyelids, and also eyebrows.³¹ Eight kinds of *rasadhṛṣṭi* are described³² (See Appendix 2 and Notes 33-72.)

Twilight space of the real and the virtual

Bhāva and *rasa* are the two key concepts according to Bharata. Though he considers *nāṭya* to be effective as a result of performance, he makes a detailed analysis of how the performance which is not realistic and identical with the world of reality for both the actor and spectator is made real in a virtual manner. The *sthāyibhāva* enlisted are pure states which can exist and together with *vyabhicāribhāva* and *sātvikabhāva* produce the necessary *anubhāva*, only if the actor can identify with the *sthāyibhāva*. The performance of the character is dependent on this preliminary identification of the actor with the state of mind of the role which is portrayed. The *sthāyibhāva* are made to exist (*bhāvayanti iti bhāvah*) by the actor so that they will be produced in the mind of the spectator (*bhāvanti iti bhāvah*) to produce the related *rasa*. The *sthāyibhāva* together with *rasa* could be considered as causing self-transcendence for the actor as well as the spectator, and complex cognitive structures for both the actor and the spectator to be in communion in space where both transcend their self-identify. It is an enactment (by the actor through *nāṭya*) which is spontaneous rather than the simple mimicry of an event or object. It is at one time physical and transcendental.

One of the unique features of *nāṭya* is that the epistemological and the experiential, the theory and technique are coordinated to form a mutually benefiting factor of the whole. Though the source of the following text is not authentically traced, it is said in both *Nāṭya Śāstra* and later in *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, and is also popular as the synoptic definition of *nāṭya*, that ‘the body should follow the tune, the hands must explain the meaning, eyes must speak the emotion and the feet must beat the time-measure; where the hands go there should go the eye, because where the eye goes the mind goes there with it, where the mind goes follows there the mental state, and where the mental state is there the feeling is.’⁷³ These two verses represent the coordinated physical, mental and transcendental nature of *nāṭya*. Equal importance is given to detailed and specific physical and mental factors involved, and each of their transcendences is specified, at the same time, to broaden the scope of experience both for the actor and the spectator.

The metanarrative

That *nāṭya* is taken a wholesome event is evident from the fact that apart from the detailed account of the current of *nāṭya* Bharata also devotes separate chapters⁷⁴ for examining the effectiveness of *nāṭya* (*nāṭya siddhi nirupāṇa*), describing in detail the nature of actors, judges and spectators, and explaining the goals of *nāṭya*. There is even a mention about the seating arrangement to be followed.⁷⁵ It might be keeping

the complex nature of *nāṭya* that Bharata enlists for male and female characters: (i) three classes of personality (*uttama*, *adhama* and *madhyama prakṛti*), and, (ii) the kinds of roles they could play.⁷⁶

The spectator of *nāṭya* is not a passive recipient, but a *prēkṣaka*, 'one who views in a unique manner'. It is evident that Bharata included the active and important participation of the spectator for *nāṭya* to be a successful enterprise. There is a list of physical representations of the responses of the spectator to *nāṭya* by making certain words⁷⁷, sounds⁷⁸, and physical and facial expressions.⁷⁹ There is also a description about who is a genuine spectator (*prēkṣaka*). He who "... has unruffled senses, is pure, clever in discussing and weighing pros and cons, devoid of faults and fond of merits. He who attains gladness on seeing another glad, sorrow on seeing another sorry and experiences wretchedness on seeing the wretchedness of another is considered fit to be a spectator..."⁸⁰

It is also said that all these qualities may not be present in one single individual, but that different individuals as spectators could have them and together experience effective appreciation of the *nāṭya*.

The goals of *nāṭya* pertain to both objective and subjective features. Through the composite of external and physical enactment, and subjective states of mind and feelings representative of them, what is achieved for the (i) actor and

(ii) spectator are: For the spectator, at the secondary level an appreciation of the characters and the theme, and at the primary level a temporary detachment from his/her self-identity is experienced. For the actor, at the primary level it is the complex task of representing a character, an idea or a nuance of a particular feeling through *abhinaya* and producing the corresponding *rasa* for the *prēkṣaka*. At the secondary level, a temporary detachment from his/her self-identity and identity with the particular character's self as a whole and with the various mental states that the character would have in the story narrated. The transcendence experienced by the actor is both transphysical and transmental since there is a combined use of body and mind. The transcendence experienced by the spectator is transmental.

And finally it is experience and transcendence

For both the actor and the spectator it is a complex experience since there is a co-existence of his/her own dominant and real self-identity with the mental states of the character portrayed. It is this co-existence, of the real self-identities of the actor and the spectator, and the identities with 'another-self', which determines the effectiveness of *nāṭya*. The interesting and intriguing feature is the existence of a contradiction. For the effective transference of a particular *bhāva* to the spectator the actor has to have an identity formed with it, transcending the artificiality of enacting it. At the same time, the actor has to be detached from any specific *bhāva* of

the character since what he/she is primarily concerned with is the narration of the story. The actor has to play the twin roles of being 'the character portrayed' and also 'the narrator of the story'. It is this twin and contradictory role played by the actor which enables the spectator to have the experience of *rasa* which also involves an interesting contradiction. Unless the spectator can be one with the mental state of the character portrayed he/she will not be able to appreciate the story and the specific nuance. At the same time unless a continuous detachment is maintained he/she will not be able to integrate the experience of that nuance in relation to his/her self-identity.

6. Re-Placing consciousness (In Indian thought)

By presenting two different instances of epistemology and experience from *darśana* and *nāṭya*, what I wish to suggest is that:

- (i) contrary to the very popular and published view that Indian philosophy is 'other worldly', there is detailed and careful presentation of what could be considered the two primary signs of consciousness, namely (a) generation of meaning and its validation, and (b) intensity of experience and broadening of its scope through its own transcendence, and
- (ii) the discussion on 'consciousness' in Indian thought is not a word-oriented (namely 'consciousness') but an experience-oriented task which looks at empirical, experiential, epistemological and teleological facets of consciousness.

Though in the present approaches to understanding of consciousness, some degree of importance is given to epistemology and to first-person experience, there is something missing. What is missing is an attempt to resist untimely classification of events and meanings of 'consciousness' under empirical/medical/ordinary and transcendental/psycho-analytic/mystical groups and their segregated and non-dynamic explanations. To be in the context of particular experiences, and to integrate them to a transcendence which will least look unfamiliar and 'other-worldly', cannot be the result of classificatory understanding or solipsistic transcendental experiences alone.

First and foremost we need to recognize 'consciousness' as a complex phenomenon and thereby dissuade ourselves from secluded and segregated analysis. The complexity of consciousness looks more and more like the delicate togetherness of understanding and being. The understanding of 'consciousness' is more an understanding of its ontology, which needs the focus of epistemology to be shifted from normal and ordinary experiences, or even abnormal and transcendental experiences, to the holistic definition of the problem, method, and goals of enquiry. This would facilitate breaking 'habitual' ways of event-oriented or object-oriented analysis by experience-oriented or first-person-oriented understanding. The categories of thinking formed by the analyst and his/her worldview will be specific and there will be potential for widening the scope of understanding.

The two questions which are important, if we are 'really' interested in understanding consciousness are (i) What are we really looking at? and (ii) What do we really want to look at? Our notions about 'real', 'truth' and 'self' have to be continuously questioned, but at the same time, integrated with personal growth, values, spiritual understanding and self-exploration.

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*See <http://www.sambodh.org> & <http://www.sambodh.com/>

**See <http://www.infinityfoundation.com>

Appendix 1

Bharata enlists eight fundamental *sthāyibhāva*, thirty three *vyabhicāribhāva*, eight *sātvikabhāva* and eight *rasa* according to the *sthāyibhāva*:

RASA

Rati (happiness)

Hāsa (laughter)

Śoka (mental pain)

Kṛōdha (anger)

Utsāha (enthusiasm)

Bhaya (fear)

Jugupsa (disgust)

Vismaya (amazement)

STHĀYIBHĀVA

Sṛṅgāra (charm)

Hāsyā (humour)

Karuṇa (compassion)

Rudra (fury)

Vira (heroic)

Bhayānaka (terrifying)

Bhibhatsa (despicable)

Adbhuta (surprise)

The thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāva* (all these are given their corresponding *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* in the *Nāṭya Śāstra*) are:

VYABHICĀRIBHĀVA

Nirvēda (disinterest)

Glāni (tiredness)

Śaṅka (apprehension)

Asuya (insecurity)

Mada (intoxication)³⁰

Sṛama (exhaustion)

Ālasya (lethargy)

Dainya (pity)

Cinta (anxiety)

Moha (delusion)

- Smṛti** (recollection)
Dhṛti (steadfastness)
Vṛida (shame)
Capalata (impulsiveness)
Harṣa (sudden delight)
Āvēga (excitement)
Jadata (stupor)
Garva (arrogance)
Viṣāda (depression)
Autsukya (longingness)
Nidra (sleep)
Apasmāra (epilepsy)
Supta (dreaming)
Vibodha (awakening)
Amarṣa (restrained anger)
Avahittha (deception)
Ugrata (ferocious)
Mati (analytic understanding)
Vyādhi (ailment)
Unmāda (temporary loss of sanity)
Marāṇa (death)
Tṛāsa (panic)
Vitaṛka (argumentativeness)

The eight *sātvikabhāva* are:

SĀTVIKABHĀVA

Stambha (paralysis)

- Svēta** (perspiration)
Romāñica (horripilation)
Svarabheta (change in the tone of voice)
Vepathu (tremble)
Vaivarṇya (change in the color of face)
Aśru (teaful)
Praḷaya (fainting)

Appendix 2

The eight *rasadhrṣṭi* are:

RASADHRṢṬI	RASA	NATURE OF GLANCE
Kānta (loving glance)	Sṛṅgāra	eyebrows moved, glance through the sides of the eyes, and eyes with an intense look, as if drinking in the object ³³
Hāsya (humorous glance)	Hāsya	eyelids are contracted one after the other, wandering pupils ³⁴
Karuṇa (compassionate glance)	Karuṇa	upper eyelid droops down with tears, wandering pupils, nose-ends intense ³⁵
Raudri (ferocious glance)	Raudra	both eyelids tremble, still pupils, red and dry eyes, strained eyebrows ³⁶
Vira (heroic glance)	Vira	steady pupils, fully opened and glowing eyes, ends of the eyes contracted ³⁷
Bhayānaka (terrifying glance)	Bhayānaka	raised and motionless eyelids, restless pupils ³⁸

Bibhatsa (disgusting glance)	Bibhatsa	eyelids come together with restlessness, unsteady pupils, eyeballs at the corners of the eyes ¹⁹
Adbhuta (surprising glance)	Adbhuta	moist eyes, pupils go in and out alternately, eye lashes slightly contracted, bright corners of the eyes ⁴⁰

The twenty-eight *bhāvadr̥ṣṭi* are:

SHTĀYIBHĀVA DHR̥ṢṬĪ⁴¹

Nature of Glance

Snigdha (tender glance)		fully opened eyes, eyebrows held up, pupils in the corners of the eyes ⁴²
Hr̥ṣṭa (joyous glance)		slightly contracted pupils which are restless, eyelids close alternately ⁴³
Dina (piteous glance)		drooping upper eyelids, restrained movement of pupils, with tears ⁴⁴
Kṛuddha (glance with anger)		motionless eyelids, dry eyes, agitated pupils, bent eyebrows ⁴⁵
Dṛpta (glance with pride)		fully opened eyes and still pupils ⁴⁶
Bhayānvita (glance with fear)		fully opened eyes, eyeballs standing out and agitated ⁴⁷
Jugupsita (glance with disgust)		contracted eyelids, look away from the object, indefinite look ⁴⁸
Vismita (glance with surprise)		fully open eyelids, steady look to a distance, pupils held up ⁴⁹

VYABHICĀRIBHĀVADHRṢṬI⁵⁰

Nature of Glance

Śunya (vacant look)

steady eyes, but not clear, look vacantly without an object⁵¹

Malina (depressed look)

pupils directed away from the object, eyelids slightly closed, clear corners of the eyes, throbbing eyelashes⁵²

Śrānta (tired look)

pupils directed to a short distance, moist eyes, tired eyeballs, slightly contracted corners of the eyes⁵³

Lajjita (glance with shyness)

eyelashes come together, tired pupils, drooping upper eyelids⁵⁴

Sankita (glance with suspicion)

eyes are alternately steady and restless, turn towards the sides outward and upward, alternate intense looks and looking away⁵⁵

Mukūḷa (fully closed look)

united and throbbing eyelashes, resting pupils⁵⁶

Ardhamukūḷa (half-opened look)

half-opened eyes and slightly throbbing, half closed eyelids⁵⁷

Glāna (languid look)

deeply sunk pupils, move very slowly, eyelashes, eyebrows and eyelids appear like that of a blind person⁵⁸

Jimha (looking distrustfully)

slightly contracted eyelids, tired and concealed pupils, look slowly⁵⁹

Kuñcita (contracted look)

eyelids and eyelashes are slightly contracted, pupils are well contracted⁶⁰

Vitarikta (look of indecision)	raised eyelids, flushed and downward pupils ⁶¹
Abhitapta (extreme painful look)	gentle movement of eyeballs, upward and downward moving eyelids, all the parts of eye indicate extreme pain ⁶²
Viṣāṇa (grievous look)	corners of the eye are sunk, eyelids wide apart and open and close frequently, motionless pupils ⁶³
Laḷita (charming look)	corners of the eyes contracted, eyebrows go up and down, and sweet look ⁶⁴
Akekara (half-closed)	eyelids at the corner of the eye are slightly contracted, half-closed look, pupils are repeatedly turned ⁶⁵
Vikosa (wide open look)	fully open eyelids and never close, unsteady pupils ⁶⁶
Vibhṛānta (distracted look)	occasional disturbed and undisturbed look, moist and wide open eyes, moving pupils ⁶⁷
Vipḷuta (floating look)	steady and drooping eyelids in succession ⁶⁸
Traṣṭa (fearful look)	extremely unsteady pupils, eyelids quickly up and down ⁶⁹

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Madira (intoxicated look)

is classified into three kinds such as the early (taruṇa), middle (madhyama) and extreme (adhama) stages

Taruṇa

corners of the eye are wide and the rest of the eye is contracted, pupil move about in a circle⁷⁰

Madhyama

slightly contracted eyelids, unsteady pupils⁷¹

Adhama

pupils move downward and eyelids are almost closed⁷²

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11. *Ibid*. pp.5-6
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13. *Ibid*. p.12
14. *Ibid*. p.3
15. *Brahmasutra* begins with the sutra 'adhato brahma jijñāsa' and *Mimāṣasutra* begins with the sutra 'adhato dharma jijñāsa'.
16. The introductory theme in *Tattvabodha* is 'sadhanacatuṣṭaya' which talks about the fourfold qualifications needed for a student interested in the enquiry of *moksa*. The fourfold qualifications are: (i) *nitya anitya vastu vivēka* (discriminatory understanding of the real and the unreal), (ii) *iha amutra artha phala bhoga virāga* (dispassionate towards the objects of pleasure), (iii) *śama ādi ṣatka sampatti* (observance of the seven values), (iv) *mumukṣutvam ca iti* (earnest desire for liberation).
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20. *nātyaśabdo rase mukhyo rasa abhivyaktikāraṇam*
Nāṭya Śāstra Samgraha: p. 20
21. *caturthābhinaya tatra āngiko angaidarsīto matah /*
vāca virācitah kavyānatakādīstu vācīkah //
āhāryo hāraḱyurākīritadivibhuṣaṇam /
sātvīkah sātvīkairbhāvaih bhāvukena vibhāvītah //
Nāṭya Śāstra Samgraha: p. 20
22. In *vācīka abhinaya* speech is *lokadharmi* and singing is *nāṭyadharmi*. In *āhārya abhinaya* wearing of ornaments is *lokadharmi* and suggesting objects by mere gestures is *nāṭyadharmi*. In *sātvīka abhinaya* shedding tears is *lokadharmi* and suggesting tears by gesture is *nāṭyadharmi*.
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23. *āngīkaṃ bhuvanam yasya vācīkaṃ sarva vangmayam /*
āhāryam candratārātī taṃ namah sātvīkaṃ śīvam //
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ucyate āsvādhyatvāt
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26. *bhāvayanti iti bhāvah*
Nāṭya Śāstra: p. 86
27. *ṣṛṅgāra hāsyā karuṇā raudra vira bhayānakah /*
bībhatsa adbuta samjñāu cetyastau nāṭye rasah smrtāh //
Studies in Nāṭya Śāstra: p. 56
Bharata talks only about eight *rasa*. It is Abhinavagupta who introduced the ninth *śānta rasa*, and also the most important *rasa*, which was essential to portray the unique spiritual nature of Buddha. *Studies in Nāṭya Śāstra*. p. 60
28. Translations of the terms are by the author.
29. *Nāṭya Śāstra: pp. 86-11*
30. Three kinds of *mada* are mentioned according to their intensity.
See *Nāṭya Śāstra: p. 95*

31. *Nāṭya Śāstra*: pp. 123-126
32. *Nāṭya Śāstra Saṃgraha*: pp. 483-491
Nāṭya Śāstra: pp. 118-119
33. See for the Sanskrit verse *Nāṭya Śāstra Saṃgraha*: p.483
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38. *Ibid*: p.488
39. *Ibid*: p.489
40. *Ibid*: p.490
41. *Ibid*: p.492-499
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42. *ibid*: p.492
43. *Ibid*: p.494
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47. *Ibid*: p.497
48. *Ibid*: p.497
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50. *Ibid*: p.500-524
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53. *Ibid*: p.502
54. *Ibid*: p.503
55. *Ibid*: p.504
56. *Ibid*: p.506
57. *Ibid*: p.507
58. *Ibid*: p.508
59. *Ibid*: p.509
60. *Ibid*: p.510
61. *Ibid*: p.511

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63. *Ibid*: p.513
64. *Ibid*: p.514
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68. *Ibid*: p.519
69. *Ibid*: p.520
70. *Ibid*: p.521
71. *Ibid*: p.521
72. *Ibid*: p.521
73. *angēna ālambayet gitaṃ hastena artham pradarsāyēt /
netrābhyāṃ darsāyēt bhāvam padābhyāṃ tālamācaret //
yato hasta tato dṛṣṭih yato dṛṣṭih tato manah /
yato manah tato bhāvah yato bhāvah tato rasah //*
Nāṭya Śāstra Saṃgraha: p. 31
74. *Nāṭya Śāstra*: Chapters.27,34,35
75. *Ibid*: p.381
76. *Ibid*: Chapters.34, 35, pp.514-530
for a detailed description of the classes and kinds of role.
77. *Ibid*: p.376
Words like '*Kastam*' for the pathetic feelings portrayed.
78. *Ibid*: p.376
Words like '*aho*' for implying 'how wonderful' the portrayal is.
79. *Ibid*: p.375
Appreciation of humour is implied with smile and laughter; appreciation of joy is expressed through horripilation.
80. *Ibid*: p. 380

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